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Abstract   
Recent studies suggest that new parties display new patterns of digital mobilization. We 
shed light on this debate: do new party supporters engage in online political activities to a 
greater extent during electoral campaigns? Do they share political images or quotes on 
social media, participate in political forums, or exchange political messages with their 
friends more often than supporters of traditional parties? No. Drawing on a post-electoral 
survey dataset in Spain, we find that offline extra-institutional political activities are key 
predictors of the level of online political engagement. Even in the context of a polarized 
electoral campaign and the emergence of new electoral forces such as Podemos, extra-
institutional political participation drives digital activism to the detriment of institutional 
variables, such as turnout or partisan preferences. Thus, all parties depend on extra-
institutional activists to boost their online campaigns. Since grassroots activists increasingly 
influence the communicative strategy of all political parties, we interpret this process within 
a long-term digital-based post-material transformation of the political culture, with major 
implications for partisan organization, mobilization, and polarization in many democracies. 
We contend that the overrepresentation of grassroots activists in producing and 
disseminating political content in social media may have favored an increase of the visibility 
and public support of political outsiders in several countries.  
 
Keywords: political polarization; activism; post-material political culture; election campaign; 
digital public sphere.  
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Introduction 
The increasing use of digital media worldwide has generated a more fragmented 
and diverse media environment in the last decade, resulting in a flow of information that 
is more fluid and harder to control. A broad range of political actors can bypass the 
mainstream media using digital platforms, reducing the influence of the traditional 
gatekeepers (Schulz, 2014), as they are able to produce and disseminate political 
content (Castells, 2015). These changes in the digital public sphere become particularly 
significant during electoral campaign periods, where political exchanges intensify. 
Following the 2008 financial and economic crisis, protests spread worldwide to 
voice political discontent and strong opposition to rising inequality and welfare 
retrenchment. Activists’ use of digital media played an instrumental role in the 
recruitment and rapid diffusion of mobilizations (Micó and Casero-Ripollés, 2014)— 
e.g., Facebook pages were used to mobilize, gain feedback from members (Kavada, 
2015), and moderate the influence of repression on the diffusion of the movement (Suh 
et al., 2017). Also, tech and media activists set up alternative media publications, 
established autonomous technological infrastructures, and ran 24-hour livestreams 
(Costanza-Chock, 2014).  
In contrast to the costly and complex organizational infrastructures that 
institutional organizations offer, Internet contributed to the decrease of such costs while 
increasing the power of entrepreneurial activists (della Porta and Mosca, 2005). In a 
way, it favored ‘organizing without organizations’ (Shirky, 2008; Klandermans et al., 
2014). Some scholars argue that these transformations challenge established views of 
what it means to be a ‘member’ (Chadwick, 2013), leading to a new type of ‘connective 
action’ characterized by the lack of clear leadership, weak organizational structure, 
predominantly personal action frames, and the centrality of network technologies 
(Bennett and Segerberg, 2012).  
 
4 
Lobera, J.; Portos, M. (2020). “Decentralizing electoral campaigns? New-old parties, grassroots and digital activism”. Information, 
Communication & Society. 
 
 To what extent do these changes affect partisan activism? Several authors have 
pointed out that the new parties display new patterns of digital mobilization, since many 
of them rely on innovative forms of digital participation (e.g. Casero-Ripollés et al., 2016; 
della Porta et al., 2017). According to this perspective, supporters of these parties would 
have a higher level of digital activism (e.g., sharing partisan content on social media 
more often) compared to traditional parties.  
 On the other hand, one could argue that all parties would be affected by an 
increase in autonomous activist participation, regardless of the macro strategy of the 
political party. Following this approach, partisan digital activism would have similar 
conditions in all parties, reflecting profound changes in the organization and 
mobilization of the parties. Certain cultural changes and the extension of the political 
use of digital tools would favor an increase in autonomous logic in partisan participation, 
similar to what has occurred in recent decades in the organization of social movements. 
The first general election in which Podemos ran in December 2015 presents a 
phenomenal setting to explore the association between electoral activism in practice 
and the evolution of political culture on the Net. In the context of new political 
competitors, what is the association between electoral behavior and digital political 
activism? To what extent is there an association between institutional participation (i.e., 
voting preferences) and digital political activism during an electoral campaign? Would 
digital activism be higher among new movement-related political parties? Does the 
emergence of a post-material political culture have an impact on digital political activism 
during an electoral campaign? 
Digital media might mobilize citizens far from traditional channels of political 
representation (Mosca and Quaranta, 2017). Several scholars have noted that new 
information and communication technologies are important resources for new parties— 
and more generally for organisations that lack access to mainstream media (Ward and 
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Gibson, 2009). Indeed, empirical evidence shows that people with more expertise and 
who are more active on Internet and on social networks are more likely to vote for new 
parties such as Podemos (e.g., Mosca and Quaranta, 2017; Casero-Ripollés et al., 
2016).  
 We contend that this line of reasoning cannot be inverted: our results suggest 
that it is not whether they vote for one party or another that determines citizens’ degree 
of political engagement in the digital sphere. Even in the context of a polarized electoral 
campaign and the emergence of new electoral forces, it is participation in offline extra-
institutional political activities which ultimately determines the level of online political 
engagement. Our findings are in line with contributions that stress post-material political 
cultures, where political participation would gradually move away from the control of 
party elites (Chadwick and Stromer-Galley, 2016; Bang and Sørensen, 1999; Bennett, 
1998; Beck, 1997), and have important implications for understanding the relationship 
of social media with the changing structure of political opportunities and political 
polarization. Digital activism of extra-institutional activists would be often outside the 
control of political elites, giving rise to new intermediation processes in the digital 
sphere and more opportunities for political challengers.  
Our empirical analyses draw on original survey data collected right after the 
December 2015 election. In the next sections we survey relevant contributions to 
address our research questions, and place our contribution in relation to extant 
literature. We then introduce the Spanish case and its importance for the broader 
readership. After that, we introduce our data, lay out the empirical design, and discuss 
our results. Finally, in the concluding section we elaborate on the implications of our 
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Electoral turnout and digital activism 
When it comes to the nexus offline-online political involvement, we can distinguish three 
main approaches in the literature on digital participation. Early contributions 
underscored the possibilities Internet could offer in terms of enhancing citizens’ offline 
relationships and political involvement (Wellman et al., 2001). Internet would help 
restore community by overcoming limitations of space and time (Sproull and Kiesler, 
1991), creating room for democratic deliberation, identity building, and organizational 
involvement (Wellman et al., 2001).  
Indeed, Internet eases the dissemination of political content, facilitating the 
connection with like-minded users and the coordination of the different interest groups 
(Hoffmann and Lutz, 2017). Importantly, most relationships formed in cyberspace have 
a continuity in physical space (Rheingold, 2000). The opposite approach, often referred 
to as thesis of replacement, would posit that development of new technologies weakens 
offline engagement as people spend more time in front of the screens (Putnam, 1995), 
embracing ‘clicktivism’ activism and other forms of low intensity activism such as online 
petitioning and participation in social media and Internet fora. Moreover, Internet may 
cause depression, alienating people from face-to-face interaction (Kraut et al., 1998).  
After subjecting the two preceding approaches to close empirical scrutiny, a 
third ‘normalization’ perspective developed, suggesting Internet does not substantially 
change the patterns of political involvement but reinforces pre-existing structures and 
inequalities (Dahlgren, 2005; Bimber, 2000). This way, Internet is incorporated into 
routine practices of everyday life, and thus “a largely null finding of participation effects 
(…), [which] emerges from attempts to discover a stimulus effect from new technology 
on political engagement or learning at the individual level. It does not appear (…) that 
new technology leads to higher aggregate levels of political engagement” (Bimber, 
2002: 4-5).  
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While we know a great deal about the determinants of offline political 
engagement (including the non-effect of Internet), we know comparatively less about 
the determinants of online political participation (Feezell, 2016). Evidence on the 
importance of resource mobilization to understand changing levels and/or forms of 
digital political participation abounds (Anduiza et al. 2010; Best and Krueger 2005; 
Gibson et al. 2005); in contrast, the association between offline and online political 
behavior is often assumed but seldom tested (see, e.g., Feezell 2016; Hoffmann and 
Lutz, 2015; Anduiza et al., 2009). In countries like Spain where opportunities for 
participation are manifold, costs and restrictions on the circulation of information are 
relatively low, people who are keen to get involved in politics would have been able to 
do so through traditional channels in the first place (Bimber, 2000, 2002). Hence, in line 
with the normalization approach,  
H.1 (Hypothesis 1): we would expect electoral turnout to be positively 
associated with higher levels of digital political activism.  
New movements parties and digital activism 
In May 2011 thousands of indignados (“outraged”) activists demonstrated and occupied 
squares to protest against austerity policies and demand real democracy in Spain (e.g. 
Lobera, 2019). These protest events are part of a broader cycle of contention, which 
contributed to the birth of Podemos, a new party launched from scratch some months 
before the 2014 European elections that gathers one million votes and gets five MEPs 
on the basis of some indignados movement’s core claims (Portos, 2019). With regards 
to organizational settings, research emphasized the continuities between square 
movements and Podemos, oftentimes referring to the latter as a ‘movement party’ (della 
Porta et al., 2017).  
 Kitschelt (2006: 280) defined movement parties as ‘coalitions of political activists 
who emanate from social movements and try or apply the organizational and strategic 
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practices of social movements in the arena of party competition.’ Relative to traditional 
parties, Podemos is less institutionalized in terms of formal party structures and internal 
decision-making processes, relying to a greater extent on grassroots mobilization— at 
least, that was the case in its first general election campaign in 2015. 
 The rapid growth of Podemos flowed from thousands of volunteer groups, the 
so-called círculos (‘circles’), which debated party positions and took direct action. 
Borrowed from the indignados movement, this organizational feature was conceived to 
promote grassroots participation within Podemos (Rodríguez-Teruel et al., 2016). The 
círculos’ use of social networking services led to organizational hybridity, as parties 
adopted and adapted digital network repertories typical of social movements (Chadwick 
2007; Casero-Ripollés et al., 2016; Lisi, 2018). By privileging communication as the 
central feature in its political action (Kioupkiolis, 2019), the party combined presence on 
broadcast television through the use of intense digital media to boost citizens’ 
engagement and self-mediation, promoting connective action (Bennett and Segerberg 
2012; Casero-Ripollés et al. 2016).  
 In this vein, Paolo Gerbaudo (2018) finds that new political formations such as 
Podemos use social media to gain momentum and online participatory platforms to 
mobilize the rank-and-file. Specifically, the party followed a ‘multi-layered techno-
political strategy’, where both ‘the front end’ (elites) and ‘the back end’ (grassroots) 
played an important role (Toret, 2015; Lobera & Parejo, 2019).  
 A number of contributions have stressed the populist character of left-wing 
formation Podemos (e.g. Font et al., 2019; Lobera, 2020). Broader scholarship on 
populism has stressed the central role that social media play in maintaining voters’ 
support for populist candidates (Kriesi, 2014). In this vein, Groshek & Koc-Michalska 
(2017: 1402) found that US voters more active in social media (creating and sharing 
political content) showed higher levels of “support for populist candidates than those 
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that are more passive receivers of political online content” during the 2016 US election 
campaign.  
 Overall, there is solid evidence that people who are younger, more educated, 
more politically sophisticated, and with Internet skills tend to be more supportive of 
Podemos (Mosca and Quaranta, 2017; Fernández-Albertos, 2015; Ramiro and Gómez, 
2017). Specifically, the frequent use of Internet and digital social media increase the 
probabilities of voting for Podemos (Mosca and Quaranta, 2017; Fernández-Albertos, 
2015). This argument has important endogenous implications. Not only that being a 
more active and sophisticated Internet user makes you keener to vote for Podemos, but 
also, 
H.2 (Hypothesis 2): we would expect Podemos’s constituency to be more 
politically active in the Web during an electoral campaign than voters of 
other parties. 
Extra-institutional political behavior and digital activism 
Although sometimes forgotten in the literature, movement actors are linked to routine 
political actors in electoral campaigns (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010). Movements often 
engage in proactive and reactive electoral mobilization and may “introduce new forms 
of collective action that influence election campaigns” (Ibid: 533). Moreover, digital tools 
offer growing opportunities for social movements and entrepreneurial activists to exert 
influence on the electoral field.  
On the other hand, researchers have noted a ‘growing disconnection between 
formal bureaucratic modes of organizational maintenance and looser, more flexible, and 
less “dutiful” engagement repertoires’ (Chadwick and Stromer-Galley, 2016: 4; Tormey, 
2015; Wells, 2015). This happens in a broad context of decreasing levels of membership 
and trust, declining partisan identification and support among the wider electorate, 
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which put under question the parties’ ability to sustain themselves (Norris, 2011; Gibson 
and Ward, 2009; Mair and van Biezen, 2001).   
While some observers seem to have discarded all expectations that political 
parties can be ‘resuscitated’ (Wilson, 2006), others have issued calls for reform and 
renewal. Following political parties’ cartelization over the last few decades (Katz and 
Mair, 2009) and the exceptional use of experts and professionals for creating 
campaigns, strategies, and marketing to strengthen its electoral appeal (Panebianco, 
1988), political parties seem to be experiencing a long-term period of adjustment toward 
post-material political culture and attitudes toward political engagement (Chadwick and 
Stromer-Galley, 2016). These shifts in political values and participation would affect all 
constituencies and imply a move away from traditional forms of loyalty-based party 
engagement and toward issue-oriented campaigns, including participation through 
alternative forms of action, such as protesting, political consumerism, community 
involvement, and so on (Tormey, 2015; Wells, 2015; Dalton, 2007). 
 There is an ongoing, vivid debate in the literature about how alternative digital 
media may be fostering self-organization and open participation (Atton, 2004; Couldry 
and Curran, 2003), challenging traditional membership (Chadwick, 2013), and favoring 
the surge of political outsiders (Jungherr et al., 2019). Similar to the changes observed 
in the social movements by Bennett and Segerberg (2012), we would also expect a 
weakening of the organizational structure of political parties, predominantly personal 
action frames, and a declining of party elite control, with a greater importance of 
network technologies. Digital tools promote cultures of organizational experimentation 
and a party-as-movement mentality that cause many to reject norms of hierarchical 
discipline and usual partisan adherence. Moreover, the effect of Internet use on 
institutional forms of political involvement, such as electoral turnout and contacting 
politicians, would be more moderate than on alternative forms of participation such as 
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social movement activism (Dahlgren, 2011; Hoffmann and Lutz, 2015).  
Earl and Kimport (2011) argue that Internet offers two key affordances relevant 
to activism: e-activists do not need to be physically present to act together, and the web 
sharply reduces costs for organizing and engaging in coordinated action. These authors 
find a positive effect between affordances’ leverage and the transformative changes of 
organization and participation in contentious activities (Íbid.). More generally, the 
elective affinity between digital tools and post-material engagement is observed with 
different intensities in what Ulrich Beck called sub-politics (1997), Lance Bennett’s 
lifestyle politics (1998), Henrik Bang and Eva Sørensen’s everyday makers (1999), and 
Russell Dalton’s engaged citizenship (2007). Accordingly,  
H.3 (Hypothesis 3): we would expect extra-institutional forms of 
participation to increase digital political activism, concealing the effect of 
electoral preferences on digital participation. 
Digital Political Participation in Spain: the Context 
The wide use of digital tools in US presidential campaigns has dominated 
scholarly literature on digital political campaigning since 2000 (Hara, 2008). Developing 
empirically informed research that incorporates other cases can advance our 
knowledge and the undertheorized association between political engagement and 
digital activism (Postill, 2012). The Spanish case provides an analytically useful case to 
shed light on the interplay between these two factors for a number of reasons.  
First, a deep transformation in the political landscape goes together with 
increasing relevance of the digital public sphere. Exchanges of information and political 
organization through Internet and social media were key to understand the level of anti-
austerity mobilization in the country since 2011 and the subsequent transformation of 
the traditional bipartisan system (Micó and Casero-Ripollés, 2014). 
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Second, political practices in the digital environment developed early and in an 
intense way. Traditionally, Spain has been among the Western countries with lower 
levels of political and citizen participation (Morales, 2005). After a period of intense 
citizen mobilization around the Transition to democracy, Spaniards’ political 
mobilization decreased during the following decades (Torcal, 1995). “Tactical 
demobilization” has been identified as one of the necessary keys enabling the elites to 
negotiate and establish “consensus politics” (Gunther, 2010: 24). Since the 1980's 
formal political participation decreased –e.g., party and union membership-, protracting 
a public sphere with no criticism towards the so-called “Transition Culture” (Martínez, 
2012). 
In this context, the appearance of the Net led to the development of a digital 
public sphere in Spain with a marked “dissident” nature and new social intermediations 
in the electoral information flows. Although traditional political actors still play an 
important role as a source of electoral information, they are increasingly sharing space 
with new social actors (Lobera and Sampedro, 2018). The general election held on 20th 
December, 2015 took place in a climate of increasing polarization, with an expectation 
to restructure the bipartisan system in the face of the emergence of new electoral 
competitors with greater mobilization capacity such as left-wing Podemos and center-
right liberal Ciudadanos (Rodríguez-Teruel et al., 2016). The preceding campaign and 
ensuing election were marked by different issues, including corruption, citizens’ distrust 
towards traditional parties and the consequences of the economic recession and 
austerity policies.  
The vote resulted in the most fragmented parliament in the country’s recent 
democratic history. While the conservative PP remained as the main force, total 
electoral support for the party went from 45% in the 2011 election to 28.7% in 2015 
(which represents a loss of 64 seats). The main opposition party’s performance, social-
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democratic PSOE got its worst electoral result to date since the Transition to democracy 
(22% support, 90 seats). Newcomer Podemos closely followed, winning some 20% of 
the vote share (69 seats). Centre-right challenger, Ciudadanos, ranked fourth (with 
13.9% of electoral support and 40 seats).  
All in all, this context lets us closely examine the determinants of the levels of 
digital political participation, providing evidence of whether new parties display different 
patterns of digital mobilization. More generally, the results allow us to better understand 
the current dynamics in party support and public opinion— in Spain and beyond. 
Data and methods 
To test our hypotheses about the determinants of digital political activism, we 
use information collected from 1,556 post-electoral structured interviews with Internet 
users (Lobera and Sampedro, 2018). The survey was fielded between December 21st 
and December 30th 2015, following the Spanish general election held on December 20th. 
The sample was built by a specialized polling agency (Netquest), implementing 
balanced quotas based on respondents’ demographic information.1 Specifically, online 
panellists were stratified by gender, age, region and size of town. The sampling has 
been done by randomly selecting, in each stratum, four records for each theoretical 
sample unit. The deviations of the sample distributions from the population 
characteristics have been corrected by weighting. The source used for weighting is the 
‘2011 Survey on Equipment and Use of Information and Communication Technology in 
Households’ from the National Statistics Institute (INE). Quality assurance and 
supervision systems were applied during the process (see Netquest, 2019). 
                                               
1 This established polling agency counts “with more than 1,300,000 panelists in over 23 countries around the world” 
(see Netquest, 2019). Specifically, for Spain they have a large enough sample of 157,916 panelists, with an average 
response rate of 50-55% (Netquest, 2019). Panel members are recruited from a host of different sources, including 
standard advertising, strategic partnerships with websites, etc. When a new panel member is recruited, Netquest records 
a host of socio-demographic information. For nationally representative samples, it draws a sub-sample of the panel that 
is representative in terms of a number of socio-demographic features, invitinf this sub-sample to complete the survey. 
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The survey questionnaire focuses on Internet uses and online political 
participation, but it also includes a number of questions covering biographical features, 
participation during the electoral campaign, and broader information on socio-political 
behavior and attitudes. In our empirical analyses, we understand online political 
participation as a ladder made up of several rungs of intensity (see Bazurli and Portos, 
2019; Pirro and Portos, 2020). Precisely, in order to build the dependent variable we rely 
on a battery of nine items that measure the frequency in which the following activities 
are carried out over the last three months (all of them are measured through an ordinal 
scale, 1-6, which ranges from "never or almost never" to "several times a day”): 1) 
“upload political images or videos on social media such as Facebook, Twitter, etc.”, 2) 
“share political phrases, texts, or quotes via social media”, 3) “participate in forums, 
blogs, or chats about the elections or politics in general”, 4) “search information about 
the candidates’ position on topics that interest me”, 5) “sign petitions, manifestos, or 
incriminations of a political nature”, 6) “visit a candidate’s or party’s website”, 7) “visit a 
civic, social or alternative information group’s or organization’s website”, 8) “send emails 
to political parties or candidates”, 9) “exchange emails with relatives or friends with 
comments on the campaign or forwarding political jokes”.  
Since the level of intercorrelation between the items is moderate-to-high (0.32 < 
Pearson’s r < 0.76), we carried out a Principal Component Analysis, which allowed us 
to construct a weighted additive scale that we used to measure the level of digital 
political activism.2 The scale is reliable, and the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
offered a solution with one single component’s Eigenvalue above the 1.00 threshold 
(Eigenvalue= 4.94; Cronbach’s α= 0.89), which accounts for 54.84% of the total 
                                               
2 We have built three alternative indices. First, instead of a cumulative index, we calculate a weighted 
average of the nine indicators. Second, we have created a simple additive scale based on the individual 1-
6 scales (potential range: 6-54). Third, depending on the degree of online activist participation, we have 
distinguished between three groups within the simple additive scale (low, medium and high, which 
correspond to 39.5%, 35.5% and 25% of the observations, respectively). We have reproduced our 
statistical models with these three alternative dependent variables, and the overall findings are robust. 
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variation. 
We perform a number of OLS regressions with robust standard errors.3 The 
survey questionnaire includes information on past voting spells and electoral turnout in 
the preceding December 2015 national election, as well as participation in a number of 
extra-institutional political activities during the last four months such as protesting, 
membership of pressure groups and boycotting/buycotting. The last three items report 
a low-to-moderate level of correlation (Pearson’s r < 0.30). In order to weigh our 
arguments against alternative explanations, we include a number of controls. The 
control variables measure grievances (whether the respondent is unemployed, 
household income), biographical availability (sex, age, education, municipality size), as 
well as political attitudes and values (ideology, trust, attention during the electoral 
campaign). Importantly, we also control for the effect the individual’s expertise as an 
Internet user can have on the level of digital activism— in Table 1, we report the 
summary statistics; for the exact wording of the questionnaire, see Appendix II. 
  
                                               
3 The histogram in the Appendix I shows the dependent variable is not normally distributed (Figure A1). The data are 
strongly skewed to the right. Further evidence confirms overdispersion. The latter happens provided the conditional 
variance exceeds the conditional mean. We run a test of the overdispersion parameter alpha. As alpha is significantly 
different from zero, we conclude that the Poisson distribution is not the most suitable modelling strategy. Although our 
measures are not discrete, the structure of our dependent variable is similar to event counts, hence we replicate all 
models with negative binomial specifications in the Appendix I (Table A1). 
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TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Digital activism scale 1379 5.49 2.78 4 24 
Sex 1502 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Age groups 1502 2.17 0.77 1 3 
Household Income 1418 1.84 0.80 1 3 
Education 1502 2.51 0.61 1 3 
Municipality size 1502 2.36 0.71 1 3 
Employed 1502 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Internet User 1502 2.85 0.42 1 3 
Ideology 1502 2.32 1.30 1 5 
Institutional trust 1502 2.79 2.29 0 10 
Campaign attention 1502 2.21 0.85 1 4 
Protest participation 1502 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Member pressure group 1502 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Boycotting/Buycotting 1502 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Electoral turnout 1499 0.89 0.31 0 1 
Party voted (ref. Podemos & 
allies)   
     
_PP 1291 0.14 0.35 0 1 
_PSOE 1291 0.13 0.34 0 1 
_Ciudadanos 1291 0.16 0.37 0 1 
_Izquierda Unida 1291 0.08 0.26 0 1 
_Other minority 1291 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Results 
We study the determinants of the level of digital activism in election campaigns. 
In the first specifications we include only the predictors related to institutional 
participation and the sociodemographic controls (Models 1-2, Table 2). While in Model 
1 we incorporate a dummy on electoral turnout, we include a multinomial variable in 
Model 2, taking electoral support for Podemos (and its confluences in Catalonia, Galicia 
and Comunitat Valenciana) as the baseline category. Turning out to vote has a positive 
impact on the level of online activism (Model 1, Table 2). Relative to voting for Podemos 
(and its allies), we observe a negative association between opting for traditional forces 
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(PP, PSOE) and Ciudadanos and other minority parties (Models 1-2, Table 2).4 
Coefficients for voting IU or other minor parties relative to Podemos and allies are not 
significant.  
When controlling for political attitudes and values, the effects of electoral turnout 
and partisan preference vanish (Models 3-4, Table 2). Self-declaring as a right-wing 
individual decreases online activism. Greater confidence in political institutions, 
especially paying attention to the electoral campaign, and more frequent use of Internet 
are positively associated with the level of online political participation. Likewise, the 
effects of extra-institutional political behavior (i.e., attending to protests and rallies, 
belonging to a pressure group, and engaging in boycotts/buycotts) are strong and 
robust (Models 4-5, Table 2). 
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TABLE 2: OLS regressions with robust standard errors, DV: Digital Activism Scale 
 
*p<0,05 **p<0,01 ***p<0,001 
 
On the one hand, the regression analyses show a robust, statistically significant, 
and positive association between the degree of political involvement in the digital public 
sphere and non-electoral offline participation. Specifically, the value on the scale for a 
person who has not participated in demonstrations or protests is 5.22, keeping the rest 
of the constant predictors adjusted to their means. Conversely, if the respondent has 
participated in a demonstration or protest, the prediction on the digital activism 
frequency scale is 6.83 (Figure 1).  
In a similar way, the predicted value of the scale fluctuates between 5.28 and 
7.69, depending on whether the person belongs to a political pressure group, ceteris 
paribus (Figure 1). The difference of value on the digital activism frequency scale 
changed from 5.19 to 5.84 if they have bought or have stopped buying products for 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Sex -0.30 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.09 0.16 -0.03 0.13 0.02 0.15
Age groups -0.12 0.10 -0.09 0.09 -0.01 0.10 -0.13 0.08 -0.08 0.09
Household Income 0.02 0.11 -0.11 0.10 -0.16 0.10 -0.15 0.09 -0.21 0.09
Education 0.14 0.13 -0.00 0.12 -0.07 0.13 -0.06 0.10 -0.09 0.12
Municipality size 0.15 0.11 -0.01 0.10 -0.04 0.11 -0.05 0.09 -0.08 0.10
Employed -0.30 0.20 -0.10 0.18 -0.05 0.20 -0.06 0.16 -0.02 0.18
Internet User 0.62*** 0.16 0.39* 0.15 0.59* 0.15 0.41* 0.14 0.63* 0.14
Ideology -0.22*** 0.06 0.00 0.05
Institutional trust 0.09* 0.04 0.11* 0.04 0.07* 0.03 0.09* 0.04
Campaign attention 1.33*** 0.09 1.33*** 0.11 1.08*** 0.08 1.05*** 0.09
Protest participation 1.61*** 0.26 1.53*** 0.26
Member pressure group 2.41*** 0.37 2.44*** 0.39
Boycotting/Buycotting 0.64*** 0.13 0.63*** 0.14
Electoral turnout 1.02*** 0.23 0.07 0.21 -0.07 0.19
Party voted (ref. Podemos 
& allies)
_PP -0.84** 0.26 -0.14 0.24
_PSOE -0.60* 0.28 -0.12 0.24
_Ciudadanos -0.93*** 0.19 -0.25 0.18
_Izquierda Unida 0.16 0.31 0.13 0.26
_Other minority -0.03 0.31 -0.08 0.29
Constant 1.02*** 0.23 8.01*** 0.74 7.44*** 0.72 6.71*** 0.66 6.08*** 0.66
N
Adj. R2
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
1233 1233 1060 1233 1060
0.0351 0.2133 0.2039 0.3668 0.3596
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ethical or political reasons. On the other hand, the predicted value of the digital activism 
scale remains constant regardless of whether or not the respondent turned out to vote 
and regardless of his or her electoral preferences (Figures 1 and 2).5 
FIGURE 1: Marginal effects of offline political participation (protest participation, 
member of pressure group, boycotting/ boycotting, and electoral turnout) on digital 
political activism scale (Model 4, Table 2)  
 
95% C.I.  
 
FIGURE 2: Marginal effects of offline political participation (protest participation, 
member of pressure group, boycotting/ boycotting, and voting spells) on digital political 
activism scale (Model 5, Table 2).  
  
Multinomial voting spells: baseline category is Podemos (and its confluences). 95% C.I.  
 
                                               
5 If using negative binomial regressions instead of OLS specifications with robust standard errors, 
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Discussion 
We compared the extent to which levels of digital political participation could be 
predicted by people’s offline participation. The results were clear: online political 
participation functions as a complement not dissociable from offline participation, and 
electoral mobilization as an extension as the individual’s extra-institutional participation. 
Although our results are not counter-intuitive nor do they contradict this line of thought, 
they do allow us to qualify previous findings, as not every form of offline political 
participation works as a determinant of online activism. Amid high levels of polarization 
and electoral mobilization, especially following the electoral emergence of new left-wing 
and movement-related parties such as Podemos that increased fragmentation, one 
could expect that electoral turnout in general (and voting for Podemos and allies in 
particular) would be associated with increased levels of online activism.  
Contending with this approach, our results show that only the least formal and 
least conventional forms of offline political participation account for the frequency of 
digital political activism. Neither electoral turnout nor partisan preferences are relevant 
predictors of the general level of online activism, as their effect is concealed by extra- 
institutional political engagement such as protesting, pressure group membership and 
having boycotted/buycotted. In fact, these three explanatory variables are, along with 
political interest, the most relevant predictors in the models, strengthening the 
hypothesis that online political participation is connected to offline participation and can 
be interpreted as an extension of it. 
Our results support Hypothesis 3 (to the detriment of H.1/H.2).  Participation in 
offline extra-institutional political activities determines level of online political 
engagement more strongly than party preferences, in line with the observations of 
Dahlgren (2011) and Hoffmann and Lutz (2015). The individual’s digital learning 
processes accumulated over the months and years (as a form of cultural capital) are 
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transferred to his/her partisan activism during the electoral campaign. It is true that 
activists are increasingly aware and conscious of the mediation opportunity structure, 
being able to adapt to, appropriate, and develop media and communication practices 
(Cammaerts, 2012). Moreover, the changes produced in the field of social movements 
in the last decade seem to be transferring in new patterns in the digital participation 
during the electoral campaigns. 
Notwithstanding limitations emerging from single-case studies, our results lead 
to important implications for other scenarios. Extra-institutional activists may be 
contributing to the surge of political challengers (Jungherr et al., 2019) and populist 
candidates (Groshek and Koc-Michalska, 2017), as empirical evidence from several 
countries testifies. Specifically, extra-institutional activists’ over-representation in the 
generation and diffusion of political content within their parties may be increasing the 
visibility of more polarized messages in social media than those designed by the party 
elites, leading to a more polarized debate discussion among the party members 
themselves. This, in turn, may have contributed to the success of political challengers 
in several countries, including the United States, Germany, and China (see Jungherr et 
al., 2019). 
The results add to the current state of the reflection on how digital technology 
can act as a driver of political change. As Jungherr, Schroeder and Stier (2019) point 
out, while some have described digital media as an instrument that deterministically 
disrupts existing structures of political power (Gerbaudo, 2018; Margetts et al., 2015), 
others have referred to the role of technology in enlarging control by incumbents in the 
form of political elites (Gohdes, 2020; Robles & Córdoba, 2019; Howard, 2005). As 
Tucker et al. (2017) suggest, this division may emerge as a sort of historical stage 
model of technology that starts by serving outsiders to defy the political elites, 
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followed by a time in which the status quo readjusts and the same technologies are 
used to avert this defiance.  
Our argument emphasizes the importance of extra-institutional grassroots 
activists both in the emergence of challengers as well as in the efforts of political elites 
to counter these challenges. In the latter case, the status quo will tend to develop co-
optation (e.g. Gunitsky, 2015) or surveillance/repression mechanisms (e.g. Gohdes, 
2020), due to the key importance of these actors in the political debate in the digital 
sphere. In the first stage, outsider candidates will try to persuade grassroots activists 
to support them, as a central strategy for their digital campaigns. This is the case of 
the UK Labour Party leader, Jeremy Corbyn (Dennis, 2019), and the three outsider 
candidates who challenged their parties in pursuit of the US Presidential nomination in 
the last years, Barack Obama (Katz et al., 2013), Bernie Sanders (Penney, 2017) and 
Donald Trump (Gervais & Morris, 2018).  
In this vein, the remarkable higher digital political activity of extra-institutional 
activists in all parties observed in our results may help to explain observations in other 
contexts. These activists may be favoring messages of more radical candidates, 
polarizing the discourse of their own parties, away from the traditional discourse of the 
party elites. Groshek & Koc-Michalska (2017) noted that voters more active in social 
media showed higher levels of support for populist candidates in the 2016 US election 
campaign, but they found no support that ideologically constrained flows of 
information (filter bubbles) were related to increasing the likelihood of higher support 
for populist candidates; conversely, they found that greater heterogeneity actually 
increased the probability of endorsing specific (populist) candidates, both in the 
Republican and the Democratic side.  
How could social media favor polarization in an environment of greater 
heterogeneity of political opinions? A grassroots-driven increasing polarization within 
each party may induce reactive polarization outside them. Experimental evidence 
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shows that exposure to opposite messages on social networks increases the political 
polarization of individuals, particularly among conservatives (Bail, et al. 2018), adding 
to the effects of the selective exposure and the principle of homophily in social media. 
Therefore, an increase of political polarization within a party due to the action of extra-
institutional grassroots activists would induce an increase of political polarization in 
rival parties, particularly on those voters exposed to a higher level of information 
heterogeneity in social media.  
Finally, our cross-sectional correlational study cannot demonstrate causality. It 
will require some other type of approaches and empirical evidence (e.g., 
experimental). Even though the endogeneity hypothesis cannot be fully ruled out, it 
does not preclude the fact that our rationale holds— and the findings in our article are 
robust and relevant.6 Incorporating controls in multivariate designs also helps us to 
weigh our argument against alternative explanations. Further examination of the effect 
of digital activists in political polarization will be an important avenue of inquiry, 
particularly given the increasing polarization that emerge for most political parties 




The current study is useful in sharpening our understanding of digital political 
activism during electoral processes. Participation in extra-institutional forms of 
political involvement (e.g. protest participation, boycotting/ boycotting, and being 
a member of a pressure group) will increase digital political activism, concealing 
                                               
6 In addition to the analyses reported here, we ran preliminary statistical analyses inverting the 
relationship of dependency between the key variables. While digital activism seems to be positively 
associated with electoral turnout, it vanishes when controlling for institutional trust and campaign 
attention. Similarly, while the effect of activism seems to be positively associated with voting for 
Podemos and allies— relative to voting for any other party—, it vanishes when controlling for extra-
institutional participation. Consistent with the normalization approach, the effects from online political 
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the effect of electoral preferences on digital participation. Our results connect with 
the theory of normalization and the emergence of a post-material culture in 
political parties.  
Digital technologies do not substantially change the patterns of political 
involvement but reinforce pre-existing structures and inequalities (Dahlgren, 2005; 
Bimber, 2000), blurring the separation between offline and online participation. 
The expansion of social media has weakened the power of political elites. 
However, this shift in the opportunity structure has not been seized equally by all 
individuals but mainly by those with greater participation in extra-institutional 
forms of political engagement. Importantly, this pattern is observed irrespective 
of electoral turnout and within all political parties. 
Our findings might help understand the surge of populist candidates (Groshek & Koc-
Michalska, 2017) and political outsiders (Jungherr et al. 2019). In short, rather than 
being determined by homophily, political polarization in social media might be 
determined by grassroots driven-polarization within each party. This mechanism can 
help explain the increase in polarization in contexts where social media induces an 
environment of greater heterogeneity of political opinions (Bail, et al. 2018). Our results 
confirm that extra-institutional grassroots activists have become central actors of new 
political intermediations in the digital public sphere (Howard, 2005; Lobera and 
Sampedro, 2018), affecting all parties during the electoral campaigns. Decentralized 
activist participation and their influence through new information and communication 
technologies could under certain conditions ‘hack’ the official campaign, potentially 
forcing the campaign leaders to hybridize or adapt their initiatives to the activists’ 
proposals.  
Are political parties therefore being forced into a process of uncartelization? 
Not necessarily. The decentralization processes of electoral communication that we 
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observe in our analysis is currently compensated for by the political parties for several 
re-centralizing strategies. These aim to recover the central influence of the political 
party on the new logic of decentralized digital activism. The changes in the digital 
sphere lead to an increasing tension between the centripetal tools of the political 
parties and the decentralizing dynamics of digital activists.  
This tension is particularly salient during election campaigns. In societies with 
acute political conflict, the activity of extra-institutional activists will be greater (both in 
relative and absolute terms) and the effect of the preference falsification -suggested 
by Mutz (2006) as a fundamental intermediating factor between levels of online 
polarization and readiness to engage in political action- will diminish. 
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Appendix I 
TABLE A1: Negative binomial regressions, DV: Digital Activism Scale  
 
 
FIGURE A1: Histogram dependent variable (Digital Activism Scale) 
 
 
FIGURE A2: Marginal effects of offline political participation (protest participation, 
member of pressure group, boycotting/ boycotting, and electoral turnout) on digital 
political activism scale (Model 5, Table A1)  
 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Sex -0.06* 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03
Age groups -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Household Income 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.02
Education 0.03 0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02
Municipality size 0.03 0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Employed -0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.03
Internet User 0.12** 0.04 0.08* 0.03 0.12** 0.04 0.08* 0.03 0.12** 0.04
Ideology -0.04*** 0.01 -0.00 0.01
Institutional trust 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.01* 0.01 0.02** 0.01
Campaign attention 0.25*** 0.02 0.24*** 0.02 0.20*** 0.02 0.19*** 0.02
Protest participation .24*** .03 .23*** .03
Member pressure group .31*** .04 .31*** .04
Boycotting/Buycotting .12*** .03 .12*** .03
Electoral turnout 0.21*** 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.04
Party voted (ref. Podemos 
& allies)
_PP -0.15** 0.04 -0.03 0.04
_PSOE -0.10* 0.04 -0.02 0.04
_Ciudadanos -0.17*** 0.04 -0.05 0.04
_Izquierda Unida 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05
_Other minority -0.00 0.05 -0.00 0.04






0.0090 0.0572 0.0539 0.0948
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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95% C.I.  
 
FIGURE A3: Marginal effects of offline political participation (protest participation, 
member of pressure group, boycotting/ boycotting, and voting spells) on digital 
political activism scale (Model 5 Table A1) 
 
Multinomial voting spells: baseline category is Podemos (and its confluences). 95% C.I.  
 
Appendix II: questionnaire and operationalization 
- Age groups: 1= 30 years-old or less; 2= 30-45 years-old; 3= +45 years-old 
- Household income: 1= 1,200€ per month or less; 2= 1,201-2,400€ per month; 3= 
+2,400€ per month 
- Education: 1= Primary; 2= secondary; 3= tertiary 
- Municipality size: 1= 10,000 inhabitants or less; 2= 10,001-100,000 inhabitants; 3= 
+100,000 inhabitants 
- Internet user: 1= "Sometimes every month" or less; 2= "several times a week"; 3= 
"daily" 
- Ideology: 0= "left", 5= "right" 
- Institutional trust: 0= "fully mistrust"; 10= 0= "fully trust" 
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